The gathering storm in the Middle
East is gaining momentum. War clouds are on the horizon and, as
with conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive
action to commence is a trigger.
Turkey’s provocative flotilla—often described in Orwellian terms
as a humanitarian mission—has set in motion a flurry of
diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for
the next round of Turkish ships, it could present a casus
belli.
It is also instructive that Syria is playing a dangerous game
with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According
to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-,
medium- and short-range missiles and Syrian territory has served
as a conduit for military material from Iran since the end of
the 2006 Lebanon War.
Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops
as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel
could not be contained.
In the backdrop is an Iran with sufficient fissionable material
to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time
to weaponize missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized
in green lights, since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions
can convince Iran to change course.
Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is
increasingly considered the “strong horse,” as American forces
incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically,
may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal
stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan, all political eyes are on
Iran.
For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional
strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the
Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear
weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of
these governments are in a precarious state.
Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East
neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni “tent” must
stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that
calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats
and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear
weapons in tow, war against Israel is a distinct possibility.
However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible
annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second Holocaust
could lead to a nuclear exchange.
The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an
active United States policy. Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged
in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region.
Despite rhetoric that suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is
intolerable, that rhetoric has done nothing to forestall that
eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure
to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated
withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to
travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic links
to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region and a
democratic ally, the Obama Administration treats Israel as a
national-security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as
possible.
As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the
“weak horse,” the one that is dangerous to ride. In every Middle
East capital the words “unreliable and United States” are
linked. Those seeking a moderate course of action are now in a
distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is
not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with
imperial exhilaration.
It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather
when it will occur and where it will break out. There are many
triggers for igniting the explosion, but not many scenarios for
containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi
Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli
victory? Or is this a war in which there aren’t victors, only
devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S.
do?
This is a description far more dire than any in the last century
and, even if some believe my view is overly pessimistic, Arab
and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to
believe in its veracity. That is a truly bad sign. |
